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A Brief History of the
U.S.-American Indian Nations
Relationship
By Richard B. Collins
he European nations that colo-
nized the Americas sought to
achieve empire as well as ac-
quire mineral wealth and land for their
settlers. Each nation aimed to wrest
land from the Indian nations, fend off
European competitors, and in time con-
trol its own settlers. Indian land was
obtained by the British government for
its American colonies under the poli-
cies of purchase, coercion, and con-
quest. Another policy was to treat the
Indian nations as separate but subject
societies. The Crown made treaties with
the tribes that ceded part of a tribe's do-
main and set aside retained lands for
the Indians' exclusive use.
American Rule
After winning independence from
British rule, the United States and its
state governments followed the same
dominant policy, acquiring Indian land
for settlers and miners, from the found-
ing until the 1920s. In pursuit of this
aim, they adopted most of the British
rules and policies, notably dealing with
tribes by treaty.
At first, the respective powers of
federal and state governments were
ambiguous. The Articles of Confedera-
tion gave Congress "sole and exclusive"
power over tribes but also guaranteed
states' legislative powers within their
borders. In 1787 the Constitution in-
stead gave Congress, in the Commerce
Clause, power to regulate commerce
"with the Indian tribes." This was un-
derstood and has been interpreted to
give Congress paramount power over
tribes. Congress then passed the 1790
Trade and Intercourse Act, which for-
bade acquisition of Indian land with-
out federal authority. For purchases
from tribes, an amended version of
this statute continues in force. The
statute also defined Indian Country as
a place apart, where citizens needed a
federal license to trade. A less strict
version of this provision continues in
force; retailers to Indians in Indian
Country still need a federal license.
The Cherokee Decisions
Eastern state governments, however,
continued to exercise authority over
Indians within their borders, purchas-
ing land in violation of the federal
statute and regulating Indian affairs
generally. Georgia passed laws claim-
ing power to govern Cherokee lands,
and a Cherokee was convicted of mur-
der by a Georgia court and hanged.
The Cherokee Nation resisted. Rep-
resented by former Attorney General
William Wirt, the Cherokees challenged
Georgia in the federal courts. Howev-
er, the only path to federal court at that
time was diversity jurisdiction, available
only to American citizens and foreign
citizens and nations. The Cherokees
were not American citizens, so Wirt de-
cided to file an original bill in the U.S.
Supreme Court claiming to be a foreign
nation and seeking judicial enforce-
ment of the Cherokees' treaties with the
United States.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1 (1831), the Supreme Court fa-
mously held that the Cherokee Nation
was not a "foreign state" as defined in
the Constitution. Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion said that the Cherokees
constituted a distinct political body,
which he characterized as a "domestic
dependent nation" but the federal courts
had no jurisdiction to hear cases brought
by tribes. (In 1875, Congress gave liti-
gants access to federal courts based on
humanrights
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federal issues; a tribe today can readily
sue to enforce its treaty rights.)
The Cherokee challenge to Georgia
reached the Supreme Court the very
next year by a different route. Georgia
required whites to obtain a state li-
cense in order to live among the
Cherokees. Failure to comply was a
felony. Two Christian missionaries
who did not comply were prosecuted
and convicted in a state court, which
rejected their defense based on the
Cherokee treaties. Upon review, the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned their
convictions. Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515 (1832), interpreted the Con-
stitution to confer paramount authority
over Indian affairs on the federal gov-
ernment and held that its treaties gave
the Cherokee Nation an enforceable
right to self-government within tribal
territory, "in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force."
For the Cherokees, this was a paper
victory. Georgia refused to obey the
Court's mandate, and President Jack-
son declined to enforce it. Three years
later, he made a removal treaty with
selected Cherokee leaders, and most of
the Cherokees suffered the infamous
Trail of Tears to Oklahoma, then called
Indian Territory. But Worcester v.
Georgia was not overturned and con-
tinues to be a defining precedent on
tribal sovereignty.
Allotment and Assimilation
During the 1850s, the Cherokees
and other major tribes in Indian Terri-
tory enjoyed relative prosperity. Else-
where, settlers filled in the nation, and
tribes that resisted were defeated in war.
Greatly reduced Indian lands came to be
known as reservations, where govern-
ment authority was imposed by agents
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
The government adopted new policies
toward tribes based on assimilation. It
promised schools and instruction in
farming, but the central feature was al-
lotment. This referred to division of
tribal common land into separate parcels
deeded to Indian families as home-
steads. From 1854, most Indian treaties
included a provision in nearly identical
terms in which the tribes purportedly
consented to patent allotments to tribal
members who requested them.
The Civil War accelerated the
changes. Factions in the major Indian
Territory tribes sided with the South.
After the South was defeated, the gov-
ernment imposed new treaties in
which these tribes also consented to al-
lotment. However, few Indians sought
allotments voluntarily, and in time
Congress decided that reservations
must be allotted compulsorily and
comprehensively. The General Allot-
ment Act of 1887 adopted this policy,
and over the next forty years, allot-
ment was imposed on more than half
of the reservations, including all Indi-
an Territory tribes. Tribal governments
became moribund. Indian agents ran the
reservations, establishing police and
courts set up by the government. Con-
gress subjected Indians to federal
prosecution for reservation felonies.
Land sold under the allotment act re-
duced tribal holdings by a whopping
two-thirds.
The Kiowa and Comanche Tribes in
Oklahoma Territory challenged com-
pulsory allotment in the courts. By
statute Congress imposed allotment on
these tribes and overrode contrary pro-
visions of their 1867 treaty with the
United States. Tribal leaders sued to
overturn the statutes, but in Lone Wolfv.
Hitchcock (1903), the Supreme Court
rejected their claim. It applied prece-
dents holding that Congress could
override treaties. More questionably, it
held that Congress had plenary power
over tribes and could compel allotment
of tribal common land. In a number of
decisions since Lone Wolf, the Court
has continued to recite the ruling that
Congress has plenary power over tribes
and can abolish tribal governments or
restrict their powers at will.
Another aspect of the allotment era
was making Indians American citizens.
For many years, federal officials deem-
ed status as a tribal Indian to be incom-
patible with American citizenship. But
in 1890, Congress broke with that pol-
icy and allowed residents of Indian and
Oklahoma Territories to become citi-
zens without renouncing tribal ties. A
1924 statute made citizens of all other
Native Americans, again without relin-
quishing tribal relations.
The New Deal and After
By the 1920s, many tribal commu-
nities were places of demoralized pov-
erty, and tribal governments had few
means to serve their people. A propos-
al by President Harding to abolish
tribes and reservations might have suc-
ceeded but for his scandals and death.
More responsible officials then began
to reexamine Indian policy, publishing
in 1928 recommendations in what be-
came known as the Meriam Report.
The Roosevelt Administration broke
with the past. The Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1934 renounced allotment,
sought to strengthen tribal governments,
and restored some common land to
tribes. Interior Solicitor Felix Cohen
and his staff compiled the 1941 Hand-
book of Federal Indian Law, the first
systematic organization of the subject,
which articulated tribal treaty and sov-
ereignty rights.
The policy pendulum then swung
back. Congressional committees pub-
lished reports and studies favoring
rapid assimilation of Native Ameri-
cans and an end to the reservation sys-
tem. Policy officially changed in 1953
with adoption of House Concurrent
Resolution 108, calling for termina-
tion of tribal governments and removal
of the federal restriction on sale of
tribal land. The same Congress passed
a statute known as Public Law 280,
subjecting reservation Indians in many
states to jurisdiction of state courts.
Numerous tribal reservations were ter-
minated, notably those of the Menomi-
nees in Wisconsin and the Klamath
and Modoc Tribes in Oregon.
Indian Renaissance
The threat of termination, coupled
with the civil rights movement, galva-
nized Native Americans into activism
in the 1950s and 1960s. National Indian
continued on page 24
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continued from page 4
organizations began to lobby Congress.
Both major political parties endorsed
tribal self-determination in their 1960
platforms, as they have in every presi-
dential year since. President Nixon for-
mally renounced termination in 1970.
Nixon also proposed that tribes be au-
thorized to operate federal programs
serving reservations. Congress re-
sponded by passing the Indian Self-
Determination Act. Under it, many
tribal governments now administer
programs funded through the BIA and
the Indian Health Service. Tribal police
and courts enforce minor crimes, and
tribal governments have departments
that address many problems of modem
resource and environmental law.
The other major development of
the modem era is involvement of the
courts. Except for claims cases against
the government for damages, tribal
rights were rarely litigated before 1959.
The right of tribal sovereignty recog-
nized in Worcester v. Georgia had lain
dormant for a century. During that
time, there was one judicial develop-
ment of note. Worcester v. Georgia
opined that treaties between the United
States and Indian nations must be in-
terpreted as the Indians would have
understood them. This was a rule of
obvious fairness for treaties written
Separating Fact
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and Congress but Indian Country itself.
The department is spending upward of
$65 million per year for accounting
work, litigation, and discovery costs
that could be redirected into other In-
dian programs. The BIA is operating
only in English and explained to tribal
parties by interpreters, and between
parties of grossly unequal powers. The
rule was extended to other agreements
with tribes in Winters v. United States
(1908). Later, the Court held that am-
biguities in statutes imposed on Native
Americans should be resolved in their






States (1918). In Lone Wolf, the Court
held that Congress, not beholden to In-
dian votes, had plenary power to im-
pose its will on them. This most unde-
mocratic relation was ameliorated by
giving Indians the benefit of doubts
in interpretation.
The Supreme Court's modem deci-
sions began with its 1959 decision hold-
ing that Navajo Indians could not be
sued by a white creditor in state court to
collect a reservation debt. Williams v.
Lee (1959). The Court expressly re-
vived Worcester v. Georgia. Decisions
since Williams confirmed the Indian
Nations' reservation sovereignty over
their members free of state jurisdiction,
except when Congress clearly provides
otherwise. In California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians (1987), the
in an environment where the require-
ments of the district court-such as
the lack of Internet access and ham-
pered communications with benefici-
aries---cause undue, expensive delays
and deficiencies in providing trust
services. The BIA needs to return to its
core mission of serving Indian com-
munities instead of dedicating limited
resources to responding to litigation
demands. Interior has a fiduciary re-
Court held that states lack regulatory
authority over tribal gaming enterpris-
es. Congress reacted by passing the In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,
the federal statute that is the basis for
tribal gaming businesses that have en-
abled some tribes to improve their
economies significantly.
However, in 1978 the Supreme Court
held that tribes have no authority to
punish non-Indians who offend against
tribal law, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe
(1978), and several decisions since have
denied tribal civil authority over non-
Indians unless based on consent or fed-
eral statute. Tribal authority to tax lessees
of tribal land was upheld, Merrion v. Ji-
carillaApache Tribe (1982), but power to
tax non-Indians lacking any contractual
dealings with tribes was denied. Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley (2001).
Indian nations in 2006 are distinct
sovereigns within our complex consti-
tutional system. Within tribal territory,
their authority over tribal members is
comparable to that of state governments,
which it displaces. They lack jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians in tribal territory,
a source of dissatisfaction that tribes
seek to change. Whether or not they
succeed, they have survived numerous
attempts to force them to disband.
Tribes have become sophisticated
players on the national political scene.
Their struggles of the last 500 years are
simply a prologue to the next.
Richard B. Collins is professor of law
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sponsibility to American Indian trust
beneficiaries and should be able to
focus on the business of carrying it out.
Ross 0. Swimmer is special trustee for
American Indians at the US. Depart-
ment of the Interior He was elected to
three terms as principal chief of the
Cherokee Nation and served one term
as assistant secretary of Indian Affairs
at the Interior
humanrights Spring 2006
